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| Lord Habgood |
Mr Poole suggested to the Archbishop that if he were uncertain, then he should err on the side of safety and assume that these embryonic humans do have ethical significance unless and until it is proved that they do not. The Archbishop did not agree
During the 1980s, ethical issues, and more particularly unethical issues, raised by the report of the Government Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (the Warnock Report) which had been established under the Chairmanship of Dame Mary Warnock, were constantly aired in the Press. It seemed that almost everyone had an opinion but one would have expected better from such a senior member of the Church of England hierarchy.
We have referred to the Warnock Report in several previous blogs because it was the source and cause of many modern ills in the field of the destruction of human embryos. Early and fragile such human embryos may be but the ethical significance of all human beings depends upon their human nature not upon their age or robustness. Future generations will look back on the current activities of the human embryo industry with horror and disbelief.
Spring 1987
Number 33
Correspondence with the Archbishop of York
On the 4th September 1985 the following letter from the Archbishop of York appeared in 'The Times':-
"Sir,
I have just seen Mr. Johnson's article of August 22 in which he quotes me as thinking that differences between "right and wrong, good and evil" are "largely a question of degree". What I actually wrote was "in practice most contentious ethical issues arise in the murky area where principles conflict, facts are ambiguous and differences are largely a question of degree".
I hesitate to accuse him of wilful misrepresentation. It is obvious though, that he does not understand the difference between holding to absolute principles and uncertainty about the precise application of those principles.
There is a factual and interpretative element in the making of actual moral decisions, which may well be ambiguous even when the moral principles themselves are clear. It is thus possible to hold as I do that innocent human life is sacred and must not be destroyed while at the same time admitting a degree of uncertainty about the ethical significance of the earliest and most fragile stages of embryonic development.
Neglect of this distinction allows the phrase "moral absolutism" to be used in two very different senses. Mr. Johnson starts his article with a perfectly proper defence of moral principles, but seems to imagine that once these are established his conclusions follow automatically and that anyone who doubts this must doubt the principles.
In the face of such confusion it is small wonder that no sensible .debate is possible, and that both so-called "absolutists" and so-called "relativists" lapse into invective.
Yours faithfully,
Ebor"
On the 30th September 1985 our Chairman, Mr. David Poole Q.C. wrote to the Archbishop as follows:-
"My Lord Archbishop,
I have read with close interest your letter to 'The Times' of 4th September.
Like you, I hold that innocent human life is sacred and must not be destroyed. Unlike you, I admit no uncertainty about the ethical significance of the earliest stages of embryonic development. If that makes me an 'absolutist', so be it. I have no liking for the term and share your dislike of invective.
May I, however, please seek clarification of one thing? If you admit 'a degree of uncertainty' (however great or small) about the ethical significance of the earliest stages of embryonic development, it must follow that you hold it possible—or probable— that those stages are ethically significant. And consistent with your tenet that human life is sacred, you would not, until that possibility or probability had been comprehensively and conclusively eliminated, countenance or condone any destruction or threat of destruction to the human embryo, however young. In short, you would not, at least until then, have any truck whatever with the sort of recommendations that are contained in the Warnock Report.
It may be that you have already somewhere made clear the opposition to those recommendations that must now follow from your fundamental and admirably expressed tenet. If so, I should be most grateful to be referred to the relevant text. But if you have not, may I with deep respect urge you to lose not one moment in expressing such opposition, unequivocally and with all the authority you wield. As you clearly understand, this is a matter of life and death.
With deep respect and every good wish,
Yours sincerely,
David Poole"
On the 7th October 1985 the Archbishop replied to our Chairman as follows:-
"Dear Mr. Poole,
Thank you for your letter of the 30th September. The background reasoning to my letter in The Times is to be found in the Board for Social Responsibility Report entitled "Personal Origins".
One of the points made in that Report is the different beliefs about the ethical status of a newly-fertilized ovum are rooted in deep philosophical differences which have been with us for a long time. It is unlikely therefore that the differences will be easily resolved.
This being so, each of us has to choose which side we believe carries the most weighty arguments.
There has been much debate over many centuries about how Christians should act in the face of such uncertainties, and it is widely recognised that uncertainties do not destroy the validity of a moral action, especially when there are good positive reasons for performing it. The alternative, a failure to act until every possible doubt has been eliminated, would be morally stultifying and would, I respectfully suggest, make the practice of your own profession impossible.
Yours sincerely,
John Ebor'
On the 10th November 1985 our Chairman replied to the Archbishop as follows:-
"My Lord Archbishop,
Thank you for your letter of 7th October 1985.
Your anxiety to avoid what you call a 'morally stultifying' failure to act seems to involve an amazing gamble with the lives of other human beings.
To very large numbers of your fellow men, and indeed of your fellow Christians, it is scarcely comprehensible that the moral significance of any human being, however young, however fragile, should be a matter for doubt. But supposing, for a moment, that it were, I should have thought that in any scheme of morality worthy of the name the degree of doubt as to the moral significance ('ethical status' if you prefer) of the very young human embryo would have to amount to a practical certainty of its moral insignificance before anything resembling justification could be found for the ending of its life.
I do not detect from what you have written anything to suggest that you have reached, or even approached, a state of such practical certainty. Quite the contrary: what you have admitted to (in words no doubt carefully weighed) is no more than 'a degree of uncertainty' about the ethical significance of early embryonic development, (The Times, 4th Sept. 1985).
It is hard to understand (and, with respect, your letter to me of 7th October 1985 does not satisfactorily explain) how, admitting no more than that and proclaiming, as you do, that 'innocent human life is sacred and must not be destroyed', you can lend your name and your authority to -the use and destruction for research of countless human embryos, however fragile or young.
Yours sincerely,
David Poole"
